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“Oh man this tastes awful....here you try it.”
It’s like we need others to experience our misery so they know exactly what we went through. We need others to validate that yes, it indeed was awf........ah hell you know where this is going so I’m going to just get it over with. For Speed Options only, here are the stats for Keeps and Pitches:
See? I told you it tastes awful. I was going to title this article the Pitt of Misery, then I saw...this. So why only Speed Options? After watching the film, Andrew and I both felt that the Speed Options had the most....marginal read choices. It’s not that TaQuon was outright wrong, but he committed too early to the keep instead of forcing the read man to commit. Matt will go into this in detail for the Option Strategy Report, so I’ll leave that to him.
Tech’s awful first half and subsequent 2nd half comeback are apparent in the stats, the comparisons for Success rate, Stuff Rate, and Opportunity Rate were as follows:
First and Second Half Comparison
Play | 1st HalfSuccess Rt | 1st Half Stuff Rt | 1st Half Opp Rt | 2nd Half Success Rt | 2nd Half Stuff Rt | 2nd Half Opp Rt |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Play | 1st HalfSuccess Rt | 1st Half Stuff Rt | 1st Half Opp Rt | 2nd Half Success Rt | 2nd Half Stuff Rt | 2nd Half Opp Rt |
Triple Opt | 50.0% | 0.0% | 37.5% | 58.3% | 8.3% | 50.0% |
Counter Opt | 50.0% | 0.0% | 50.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
Trap | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
Rocket Toss | 100.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
QB Follow | 50.0% | 50.0% | 50.0% | 42.9% | 0.0% | 28.6% |
QB Draw | 66.7% | 0.0% | 66.7% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% |
Speed Option | 50.0% | 33.3% | 50.0% | 60.0% | 0.0% | 60.0% |
The biggest improvement in the 2nd half was on the Triple Option. Not only did the opportunity rate increase to 50%, the highlight yards per opportunity rose from 1.3 to 4.3. The Triple was by far the most called play this game, so even seemingly small changes in rates made a huge difference.
Total Game by Play
Play | Count | YPC | Success Rate | Stuff Rate | Opportunity Rate | Highlight Yards Per Opp | Total Highlight Yards |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Play | Count | YPC | Success Rate | Stuff Rate | Opportunity Rate | Highlight Yards Per Opp | Total Highlight Yards |
Triple | 20 | 5.4 | 55.0% | 5.0% | 45.0% | 3.3 | 30 |
Counter Opt | 3 | 6.3 | 33.3% | 0.0% | 33.3% | 10.0 | 10 |
Trap | 3 | 3.3 | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0 | 0 |
Toss | 1 | 6.0 | 100.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 1.0 | 1 |
QB Follow | 9 | 3.2 | 44.4% | 11.1% | 33.3% | 1.0 | 3 |
QB Draw | 5 | 6.4 | 80.0% | 0.0% | 80.0% | 1.6 | 6.5 |
Speed | 11 | 12.2 | 54.5% | 18.2% | 54.5% | 15.3 | 92 |
It’s easy to look at these numbers and ask why there weren’t more called Speed Options, but it comes down to the looks Pitt was giving. Pitt switched between the front USF used last week (which was killed by Speed Options), and the more classic look defenses have used in the past. Again, that’s more for the Option Strategy Report. The important takeaway is that the speed options were called to counter the first look, and wasn’t as effective against the second. Had Paul Johnson spammed Speed Options all game, the numbers would not look nearly as pretty for that play.
While the QB follow is never going to be a play that generates many highlight yards, the numbers for this game weren’t great. Considering the fact that the lead blocks observed were just ok and Mason/Howard had great days carrying the ball, I personally found it curious that not a single Zone Dive was called, only Follows.
Both guards struggled mightily with Trap pull blocks, and it showed.
Finally, the breakdown by player:
Total Game by Player
Player | Count | YPC | Success Rate | Stuff Rate | Opportunity Rate | Highlight Yards Per Opp | Total Highlight Yards | FBS Season HL Total |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Player | Count | YPC | Success Rate | Stuff Rate | Opportunity Rate | Highlight Yards Per Opp | Total Highlight Yards | FBS Season HL Total |
Marshall | 27 | 4.2 | 44.4% | 14.8% | 40.7% | 2.8 | 30.5 | 120 |
Mason | 10 | 9.4 | 60.0% | 0.0% | 50.0% | 10.0 | 50 | 98 |
Howard | 8 | 10.3 | 50.0% | 0.0% | 50.0% | 11.6 | 46.5 | 46.5 |
Searcy | 5 | 7.6 | 80.0% | 20.0% | 80.0% | 3.9 | 15.5 | 46.5 |
Lynch | 3 | 0.7 | 33.3% | 33.3% | 0.0% | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Jarrett | 1 | 3.0 | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Oliver | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0 | 0 | 23.5 |
Benson | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0 | 0 | 18 |
Cottrell | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0 | 0 | 3.5 |
They had great blocking, but both Mason and Howard had stellar days on the ground in their own right. Howard finally got his opportunity, and did not disappoint. I’ve been high on Howard since he signed, so it was nice to see him finally break out this year. Benson will still be missed, but the depth at the position really helps. Mason and Howard were 1st and 2nd in highlight yards, supplanting last week’s leader, TaQuon Marshall. Marshall still has the season lead for games against FBS competition, but Mason is only 22 highlight yards behind.
Clinton Lynch has suffered from a lack of opportunities this year, at least in the run game. He has produced plenty in the pass game, however. Still, the A-backs were not involved in this game to an alarming degree. It’s easy to point to Marshall, but the pitch issues that stood out most were when he didn’t pitch to the B-back.
Just one Rocket Toss was called, early in the game. It went for 6 yards, a success! It was a bit surprising that CPJ didn’t go back to it at all.
That’s all for this week! We are working on getting each play’s left/right splits broken out in order to look specifically at opportunity rate. Which side has the better blocking record and by how much?